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Violent Neighborhoods, 
Violent Kids 
Marcia R. Chaiken 
Faced with precipitously rising rates of 
youth violence in the Nation's Capital, the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention (OJJDP) in 1995 funded congres-
sionally mandated research on juvenile vio-
lence in the District of Columbia. The re-
search was intended to examine this trend 
and recommend potential means for reduc-
ing violence among youth in DC. One part 
of the research, carried out by The Urban 
Institute, focused on identifying where and 
when violence involving children was 
taking place in the District. Other stud-
ies, completed by the Institute of Law and 
Justice (ILJ), sought to describe DC's juve-
nile justice system and to examine the char-
acteristics of children in three areas in 
the city identified by The Urban Institute 
as having the highest rates of juvenile 
homicide and violence. 
This Bulletin presents the findings of 
research conducted by LINC 1 which exam-
ined the types of delinquent behavior 
found among boys living in the three most 
violent neighborhoods in DC and the 
1 LINC is a small interdisc iplinary research center 
founded in 1989 and based in Alexandria, VA. Recent 
and ongoing LINC projects include evaluations of health 
services programs for underserved children, subs tance 
abuse prevention programs, and programs for hard-to-
reach populations. LINC has also completed research 
on law enforcement tactics and community actions for 
reducing crime and supporting sound child and adoles-
cent development. 
role of basic institutions such as fami-
lies, schools, churches, and youth-
serving organizations in those boys' lives. 
As set forth in detail below, the findings of 
LINC's research (referred to in this Bulle-
tin as "the LINC Study" or "the study") are 
based on statistical analyses of data col-
lected by ILJ in interviews with a random 
sample of boys. Findings are also based on 
LINC's interviews of administrators and 
staff members of national youth-serving 
organizations with regional offices in DC 
and local organizations that receive 
funds for delinquency prevention. Written 
materials provided by these organizations 
were also used as sources of information. 
The LINC study was based on theory and 
prior research from two scientific disci-
plines: criminology and youth develop-
ment. Criminologists recognize that al-
though many people, including children, 
break laws, only a few become persistent 
offenders who commit numerous serious 
crimes. Research on youth development 
indicates that even under the worst condi-
tions, many children and adolescents are 
resilient and, given an opportunity to 
learn and practice social skills, most can 
become productive and self-sufficient 
adults. The LINC research concentrated on 
determining the characteristics of the DC 
boys who were delinquent and identifying 
resources for social skill building available 
to these boys. 
From the Administrator 
Delinquency poses a serious chal-
lenge to virtually every major Ameri-
can city. This Bulletin features findings 
from the LINC study that describe the 
characteristics of delinquent males in 
our Nation's Capital and the resources 
available to them. 
Finding little difference between 
serious, violent juvenile offenders in 
the District of Columbia and those in 
other cities, the author argues that 
existing national research can serve 
as a catalyst for new initiatives to 
reduce juvenile violence in the District. 
Indeed, since the LINC research was 
completed, the District has reorganized 
its funding delivery system for juvenile 
justice and delinquency prevention 
efforts. As a result, enhanced Federal 
and local resources will be available for 
youth-serving agencies to develop new 
policies, practices, and service delivery 
programs. OJJDP and other Federal 
agencies are partnering with the 
District to provide technical assistance 
and other resources as it designs and 
implements an improved juvenile 
justice system. 
Thus, while this Bulletin presents some 
disturbing findings about the nature 
and incidence of juvenile delinquency 
in the District of Columbia, it also offers 
considerable hope for the future. 
John J. Wilson 
Acting Administrator 
The nature of many of LINC's findings 
will not surprise practitioners, policy-
makers, and researchers familiar with pat-
terns of juvenile violence and the deep 
problems plaguing the Nation's Capital. 
LINC found, for instance, that the majority 
of adolescent boys in the study sample 
have basic needs that are unmet. Many are 
unsupervised and unsupported by fami-
lies, schools, and community organiza-
tions that could teach them skills needed 
to lead productive lives. The most seri-
ously delinquent boys, the study found, 
are alienated-even from other youth in 
the neighborhood-and struggling to earn 
money (both legally and illegally). 
LINC also found several barriers to effec-
tive delivery of youth services in DC. Unlike 
many cities that have made progress fight-
Ing juvenile violence, DC has too few adults 
actively working with and guiding youth in 
its most dangerous neighborhoods. Given 
significant cuts in funding and other re-
sources, youth-serving organizations in DC 
have been forced to compete for the scarce 
resources that remain available. 
Notwithstanding such discouraging 
findings, LINC believes that conditions in 
DC-even in the worst neighborhoods-
can improve. It found, for example, that a 
large percentage (22 percent) of adoles-
cent boys in violent neighborhoods in DC 
resist committing any criminal acts. Even 
among boys who are delinquent, most 
limit themselves to relatively less serious 
patterns of delinquency (i.e., theft and 
other property crimes or occasional 
fights). Some of the most seriously delin-
quent children in DC (e.g., those who have 
committed a robbery)2 are reaching out to 
adults for guidance. LINC also found that 
hundreds of adults living in DC are willing 
to be trained to meet the basic develop-
mental needs of delinquent youth. 
The findings of the LINC study and LINC's 
subsequent comparison of DC with other 
cities in the Nation raise several policy im-
plications. To involve more adults in youth 
development and improve conditions for 
youth in DC, the District will need to devote 
additional resources to the development of 
leadership, coordination, and strategic plan-
ning for youth. Based on studies of other 
cities' responses to crime, violence, and 
juvenile delinquency, LINC suggests specific 
actions that need to be taken for DC to ad-
dress, and eventually reduce, problems with 
crime, violence, and juvenile delinquency. 
2 Such seriously delinquent children also typically 
commit many burglaries, assaults, or other property 
crimes, or are involved in selling drugs. 
Study Design 
and Methods 
The LINC Study was accomplished 
through the use of two main research 
methods: analysis of self-reported data 
and analysis of data concerning youth 
services available in DC. 
Each research method is described in 
detail below. 
Analysis of Self-Reported 
Data 
Research staff from Howard University 
and ILJ administered a lengthy question-
naire to a random sample of 213 boys who, 
in the summer of 1996, were living in one 
of the three census tracts in Washington, 
DC, identified as having the highest rates 
of juvenile violence during the previous 
3 years. 3 The sample, the questionnaire, 
and LINC's analysis of the boys' responses 
are described below. 
The sample. The random sample in-
cluded 213 boys ages 13 to 17, 98 percent 
of whom identified themselves as black 
or African American. ILJ and Howard 
University's process of recruiting boys for 
interviews and selecting the study sample 
involved several steps. First, a team of re-
searchers from Howard University in mid-
1996 canvassed the three census tracts and 
completed a form describing the physical 
conditions (for example, presence of graffiti 
or trash) of each block face .4 They also 
interviewed a member of each household 
to identify any boys living there between 
the ages of 13 and 17. Team members gen-
erally operated in pairs and discussed the 
project with whoever answered the door. 
In particular, they asked about the number 
and ages of boys in the household, explained 
the $15 payment available to any eligible 
youth who successfully completed an inter-
view (pointing out that only one boy per 
household could participate), and distrib-
uted a flier about the project. 
This approach succeeded in letting the 
community know about the survey; how-
ever, information about the number of boys 
in each household was generally not forth-
coming. Community members were suspi-
cious of the team's inquiries and frequently 
informed team members that no eligible 
' A description of the methods used to identify these 
census tracts appears in The Urban Institute's 1997 
report Patterns of Violent Crimes Committed Against 
Juveniles in the District of Columbia (Gouvis, Johnson, 
and Roth, 1997). 
'The term "block face" refers to one side of a street 
between two cross·streets or intersections. 
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boys lived in their households (even when 
accepting the flier and asking questions 
about the interview process). As a supple-
mental approach to the canvass, key mem-
bers of the Howard University research 
team provided fliers to community activ-
ists, businesses, and churches in the three 
census tracts. 
Researchers eventually interviewed 
295 boys, either in their homes or at com-
munity centers. Of these, seven were unable 
to complete the interview process because 
of cognitive impairment. Interviewers used 
a seven-item Short Blessed Scale Exam 
(Katzman, Brown, and Fuld, 1983) to assess 
cognitive ability. Seventy-five of the remain-
ing 288 who completed the interview had to 
be excluded from analysis. Primary reasons 
for exclusion were that a respondent was 
not from one of the three census tracts or 
that a respondent was from the same house-
hold as another respondent. Other reasons 
included a refusal to answer key sections of 
the questionnaire, an interviewer's judgment 
that answers were untruthful, and disruptive 
behavior during the interview. 
As reflected in figure 1, the 213 boys 
in the sample can be classified into five 
groups, based on the types of criminal be-
havior, if any, they reported committing. 
Classification of the boys according to the 
type of criminal behavior committed was 
carried out using methods developed by 
the author (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1984) 
that have been replicated by numerous 
researchers (Johnson eta!. , 1985). The 
classifications were as follows:5 
+ Good kids (21.6 percent). Close to one-
quarter of boys in the study sample re-
ported committing no delinquent acts 
(acts which if committed by adults would 
be crimes), and most (70 percent) of 
these "good kids" reported committing 
no other juvenile offenses. However, 
30 percent of the good kids reported hav-
ing committed one or more noncriminal 
status offenses (such as drinking alcohol 
or running away from home during the 
6 months prior to their interview). 
+ Fighters (19.2 percent). This group of 
boys, called fighters, reported commit-
ting assaults but no other crimes. Each 
fighter reported committing, on average, 
slightly more than two assaults each 
year. Representing 19.2 percent of the 
sample, the fighters reported that they 
5 The names used for categories of juveniles in this Bulle-
tin were developed as part of the DC study and are based 
on, but not Identical to, the names used for categories of 
adult offenders In Varieties of Criminal Behavior (Chaiken 
and Chaiken, 1982). 
Figure 1: Types of Delinquent Behavior Among Adolescent Boys in 
Three Violent DC Neighborhoods 
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Note: Detail may not total 1 00% because of rounding error. 
did not steal or use force to take other 
people's money or other possessions. 
Nor were they involved in selling drugs 
or significantly more likely than good 
kids to commit noncriminal offenses. 
+ Dealers (4.7 percent). A small percent-
age of the boys in the sample were 
considered to be dealers, meaning that 
they reported committing no crimes 
other than selling drugs and occasion-
ally getting into fights. 6 Dealers as a 
group were responsible for only a 
small fraction (less than 2 percent) of 
drug sales made by the boys in the 
sample. On average, each dealer re-
ported selling drugs slightly more than 
once every other month. 
+ Property offenders (31.9 percent). This 
group reported committing property 
offenses such as burglary and auto theft 
but was not involved in drug selling. 
+ Property offenders/drug dealers (15.5 
percent). This group includes those 
boys who reported committing prop-
erty offenses and dealing drugs. 
+ Robbers (J percent). The final group, 
the most criminal of those in the study 
sample, includes boys who reported 
committing a spectrum of crimes, in-
cluding robbery. 
6 Only a few (three) of the dealers reported getting 
into lights. 
The questionnaire. In mid-1996, Howard 
University and ILJ research staff conducted 
one-on-one interviews of each boy in the 
study sample. During these interviews, 
which typically lasted 2'/,hours, there-
searchers administered a lengthy and 
detailed questionnaire and recorded each 
boy's answers to the questions.' The 70-
page questionnaire, written and designed 
by Drs. Beverly R. Fletcher and Louis E. 
Wright, Jr., of Howard University, incorpo-
rated items from questionnaires previously 
designed and fielded as part of OJJDP-
funded studies of delinquent behavior, 
including a parallel effort completed in 
Los Angeles, CA.8 The results of reliability 
analysis indicated that boys in the study 
sample responded in a consistent and 
truthful manner.9 In addition, the patterns 
of delinquency and other offenses reported 
by DC boys closely resembled those 
'For additional information on the questionnaire and 
the methods used to select the sample and administer 
the questionnaire, refer to McEwen (1998). 
8 Two directors of past and ongoing studies, Dr. David 
Huizinga of the Institute for Behavior Sciences (Univer-
sity of Colorado) and Dr. Cheryl Maxson of the Univer-
sity of Southern California, served as advisers to Drs. 
Fletcher and Wright and reviewed drafts of the survey 
as it was being designed and pretested. 
'Most reliability scales, as reflected by Cronbach 's 
alpha, were consistent between the two studies and 
were generally greater than 0. 70. 
3 
reported by boys in previous studies, sug-
gesting that the DC boys were neither more 
nor less truthful than other boys inter-
viewed about delinquent acts or other juve-
nile offenses they might have committed. 
The questionnaire sought information 
on the following subjects: 
+ Personal matters, including age, race, 
and ethnicity; whether the boys had 
fathered children or been responsible 
for any pregnancies; what schools they 
attended; and whether they held a job. 
+ Participation in afterschool activities, in-
cluding school programs or clubs, athlet-
ics, youth organizations, religious groups, 
or any other community activities. 
+ Adult supervision received (especially 
during afterschool hours). 
+ Emotions, including any feelings of 
isolation. 
+ Involvement in crime, delinquency, or 
gangs (during lifetime and within the 6-
month period prior to the interview). 
Data analysis. After research staff ad-
ministered and recorded answers to the 
questionnaires, LINC analyzed the boys' 
responses. The primary statistical meth-
ods used to analyze responses were de-
scriptive techniques (such as generating 
measures of dispersion and central ten-
dency) and analysis of variance. LINC used 
the latter method to determine whether 
differences between the groups of boys in 
the study sample were real or simply the 
result of chance. This Bulletin reports only 
those findings that are statistically signifi-
cant at the 5-percent level or better (mean-
ing that at least 95 percent of the time, dif-
ferences are not due to chance). 
Analysis of Youth 
Services Data 
The second research method utilized in 
LINC's study was the analysis of informa-
tion concerning youth services available in 
DC. LINC gathered this information in two 
ways: by interviewing administrators and 
staff of youth-serving organizations and by 
reviewing documentation provided by 
these organizations. The types of organiza-
tions contacted and the procedures used 
to secure information are described below. 
Organizations contacted. When select-
ing organizations, LINC's primary source 
was the Resource Directory of Youth Services 
in the District of Columbia (prepared in July 
1994 by the Mayor's Youth Initiative), 
which lists and describes 618 programs 
for DC youth. Seventy-two programs in the 
directory defined their purpose as delin-
quency prevention. Of these, 40 programs 
administered or provided services only to 
adjudicated youth or those awaiting trial, 
4 programs provided drug treatment or 
drug prevention services, and 8 either pro-
vided no direct services or served only chil-
dren under age 13 or adults. Of the 20 re-
maining delinquency prevention programs, 
LINC selected 12 that represented 3 types of 
youth-serving organizations: 
+ Affiliates of national organizations 
specifically geared to youth, including 
the Camp Fire Potomac Area Council, 
4-H/Youth Programs, Cooperative 
Extension Service for the District of 
Columbia, Girl Scouts of the Nation's 
Capital, Boys & Girls Clubs of the 
Chesapeake/Potomac Region, the 
National Capital Area Council of Boy 
Scouts of America, Big Sisters of the 
Washington Metropolitan Area, and Big 
Brothers of the National Capital Area. 
+ Affiliates of national organizations 
whose broader missions include youth 
services, including the YMCA of Metro-
politan DC and Associated Catholic 
Charities' Family and Youth Services. 
+ Local youth organizations, including 
the Metropolitan Police Boys & Girls 
Clubs and the Sasha Bruce Network. 
Although the number of organizations 
contacted was far from exhaustive, these 
12 organizations were representative of the 
types of organizations then offering delin-
quency prevention programs and youth 
development and social skills activities to 
DC adolescents who had not necessarily 
been adjudicated. LINC's research focused 
on programs that DC teens could choose 
to participate in rather than those that 
youth were ordered (by a court) to 
participate in. 
Interviewing administrators and staff. 
LINC collected data about youth services 
in DC in a series of structured telephone 
calls and in-person interviews with 20 ad-
ministrators and staff members of the 
youth-serving organizations selected. 
When conducting these calls and inter-
views, the author used structured proto-
cols, which listed questions to ask and 
specified a way to record responses 
consistently. Respondents, however, were 
encouraged to provide information in a 
conversational mode rather than a didac-
tic format. Telephone interviews lasted on 
average 30 minutes, and in-person inter-
views lasted on average 1 hour. 
In gathering information on youth-serving 
organizations, LINC focused on programs 
and approaches available for youth at high 
risk of committing or becoming victims of 
violent acts, especially youth living in the 
three study areas. Researchers also sought 
information on coordination between the 
organizations and government agencies or 
nonprofit groups in DC. ILJ staff collected 
additional information about the status of 
youth services by conducting a telephone 
survey to update the Resource Directory 
discussed above. 
Gathering written materials. In addi-
tion to seeking verbal responses from ad-
ministrators during interviews and calls, 
LINC asked about the availability of written 
materials on such issues as geographic 
areas served, programmatic activities pro-
vided, participant characteristics, and coa-
litions with which the organizations were 
working. At the end of each interview, LINC 
reviewed with the respondent a list of writ-
ten materials to be furnished. Materials 
were then either provided immediately or 
mailed to LINC. 
Findings 
The findings in this study fall into 
three broad categories: patterns of de-
linquency, supervision and activities of 
the boys during and after school, and 
barriers to effective delivery of youth 
services in DC. Findings under each 
category are presented below. 
Patterns of Delinquency 
Even among the relatively homoge-
neous group of boys in the study sample 
(all adolescent boys from three predomi-
nantly poor and predominantly African 
American DC neighborhoods), the study 
found significant distinctions based on the 
type of delinquency, if any, the boys were 
involved in and additional characteristics. 
In examining patterns of delinquency, the 
LINC study considered both the level of 
involvement in delinquency (delinquency 
category) and the effect of the following 
factors: drug dealing, age, employment, 
feelings of social isolation, gang member-
ship, and substance abuse. 
LINC's findings reveal patterns of delin-
quency among adolescent boys in DC that 
are very similar to those among youth in 
other cities. Consistent with the findings of 
previous research, for example, LINC 
found that a small percentage of offenders 
are responsible for a large proportion of 
the crime in DC's most violent neighbor-
hoods (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972; 
Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; and Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion, 1998). As explained in greater detail 
in the "Comparative Analysis" section of 














Note: Juvenile offenses include both delinquent acts (which are crimes if committed by 
adults) and status offenses (such as drinking and truancy). 
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Figure 3: Percentage of All Assaults Committed by Different Groups 












Note: Good kids category is not included because the group (by definition) does not engage in 
delinquent activities, including assault. Detail may not total 100% because of rounding error. 
Figure 4: Percentage of Drug Deals Committed by Different Groups 








Note: Good kids, fighters, and property offenders are not included because these groups (by 
definition) do not deal drugs. 
this Bulletin, however, DC's responses to 
juvenile crime and violence were found to 
differ significantly from those implemented 
in other cities that have successfully re-
duced levels of juvenile crime and violence. 
Delinquency category. LINC found that 
a large proportion of the crime in the three 
study neighborhoods was committed by a 
small percentage of boys in the sample. In 
particular, it found that the robber category 
(representing only 7 percent of boys in 
the sample) was responsible for 36.2 per-
cent of all reported delinquent acts in the 
three study neighborhoods (figure 2). 
This same small group committed close to 
one-fourth (20.5 percent) of all juvenile 
assaults in the three neighborhoods (fig-
ure 3). Fighters, by contrast, committed 
only 10.6 percent of juvenile assaults. 
The data also showed that robbers on 
5 
average assaulted 12 people each year 
(about 6 times as many as the fighters). 
As shown in figure 4, boys in the rob-
ber category were responsible for close 
to half (44 percent) of all drug deals com-
mitted by boys in the study sample dur-
ing the 6-month period preceding the 
study. The robbers also committed al-
most half (44 percent) of all property 
crimes completed by boys in the sample 
during the same time period. 
Drug dealing. In examining patterns of 
delinquency, the LINC study found that most 
boys involved in selling drugs were less vio-
lent than those engaged in other criminal 
activities.1° Consistent with prior research, 
the study also found that many different 
types of youth (as opposed to any one ste-
reotypical drug dealer) are involved in sell-
ing drugs (Chaiken and Johnson, 1988). 
While the dealers, as noted above, re-
ported committing assaults infrequently, 
property offenders/drug dealers reported 
being very active offenders, with each 
on average committing more than 55 de-
linquent acts during the 6-month period 
preceding the interview. This group, 
however, committed approximately 50-
percent fewer assaults than the fighters 
and approximately 60-percent fewer as-
saults than the dealers. 
The category responsible for the great-
est number of violent crimes in the study 
neighborhoods was the property offenders. 
These boys-who do not deal drugs but are 
involved in theft, auto theft, vandalism, and 
other property crimes-represented about 
one-third (31.9 percent) of all boys inter-
viewed and reported committing, on aver-
age, eight assaults or other violent crimes 
each year. While the property offenders 
committed fewer crimes on average than 
the robbers (most of whom commit more 
than 80 each year), they outnumber the 
robbers by about 4 to 1 and therefore, as a 
group, commit many more acts of violence. 
In addition, property offenders as a group 
were found to commit a total of about twice 
as many property offenses as the property 
offenders/drug dealers. 
10 Note that this section describes findings on all boys 
who reported dealing drugs (whether dealers, prop-
erty offenders/drug dealers, or robbers). The "dealers" 
category, by contrast, includes boys in the sample 
whose only reported criminal activity was drug deal-
ing. Therefore, even though most robbers reported 
being very active drug sellers, they are considered 
robbers rather than dealers, because their reported 
criminal activity involves a whole spectrum of crimes, 
including robbery. 
Table 1 : Percentage of Boys Who 
Reported Holding a Job, 


















Although most boys in the study who dealt 
drugs-whether dealers, property offenders/ 
drug dealers, or robbers-committed sig-
nificantly fewer assaults than nondealers 
(with the notable exception of the robbers), 
they carried weapons more frequently.n 
Because those dealing drugs were more 
likely to carry weapons, assaults involving 
these boys were more likely to have lethal 
outcomes than those involving boys who 
used only their hands, feet, or a blunt in-
strument (Felson and Messner, 1996). This 
finding supports the view of many research-
ers that although drug dealing may not 
directly cause higher overall rates of vio-
lence, it results in youth arming themselves 
and, as a result, causes higher homicide 
rates (Blumstein, 1996). 
Age. Even among adolescent boys, age 
was found to make a difference. The study 
found, for example, that the least delin-
quent boys (the good kids) were the 
youngest (with a median age of 14.65) and 
the most delinquent (the robbers) were 
the oldest (with a median age of 15.83). 
Employment. Overall, 30 percent of the 
boys interviewed for the study reported 
having a job during the school year. 12 As 
shown in table 1, the most seriously delin-
quent boys were the most likely to report 
having a jobP 
Social isolation. Like many adolescents, 
boys in the study sample were likely to 
report feeling different from or isolated 
11 As used in this Bulletin, the term "weapon" includes 
firearms (handguns, rifles, or shotguns) and knives-
but not rocks, bottles, fists, or feet. 
12 Although the questionnaire did not distinguish be-
tween legal and illegal jobs, it asked about employment 
in the context of prosocial activities (such as participa-
tion in religious activities). 
13 The study, however, draws no conclusion as to 
whether the relationship bEtween employment and 
delinquent behavior is coincidental or causal. 
from their peers. More than half (52.6 per-
cent) agreed with the statement, "I usually 
keep to myself because I am not like other 
people my age." The most seriously delin-
quent boys were most likely to agree with 
this statement, with 77 percent of the rob-
bers agreeing or strongly agreeing with it 
and none strongly disagreeing. By contrast, 
less than half (41.4 percent) of the fighters 
agreed with the statement, and 20 per-
cent strongly disagreed. Although adoles-
cents typically have concerns about fit-
ting in, the robbers seemed to have more 
extreme concerns. 
Gang membership. While stories about 
gang wars dramatically portrayed by the 
media may suggest that gang membership 
is rampant in high-crime neighborhoods in 
the United States, 14 only 15 percent of boys 
in this study reported ever having joined 
a gang. The likelihood of joining a gang 
was somewhat higher for the more delin-
quent boys. Less than 9 percent of the 
good kids and the fighters had ever 
joined a gang, compared with one-third 
of the robbers. Dealers were also likely 
to have been gang members, with 30 per-
cent reporting gang membership at some 
time. 
Consistent with findings in other cities, 
this study showed that gang membership 
in the three neighborhoods examined lasted 
a relatively short time (between 1 and 2 
years) (Loeber, Huizinga, and Thornberry, 
1996). Of the boys who reported ever hav-
ing joined a gang, only 4.2 percent reported 
still being members at the time they were 
interviewed. 
The study also found that neither the 
length of time that a boy belonged to a gang 
nor any current gang membership was re-
lated to the seriousness of delinquency, if 
any, that the boy was committing. Robbers 
were no more likely than less delinquent 
boys to be current gang members. 
Although studies in other cities suggest 
that boys commit more crimes when they 
belong to gangs (Thornberry and Burch, 
1997), this study found that boys who were 
still gang members at the time of their in-
terviews committed essentially the same 
number of assaults and other crimes in the 
weeks immediately before the interview as 
did nongang members. 
Substance abuse. Notwithstanding a 
widespread belief that drug use is high 
among all adolescents who engage in 
14 For recent examples, see Mike Robinson's article, 
"Chicago Cop Accused of Running Guns," printed in 
The Washington Post on April 16, 1999. 
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delinquent behavior, 15 the use of illegal 
drugs (other than marijuana) has played 
little part in the pattern of delinquency 
among youth in the District. The use of 
crack or heroin was rare among boys in the 
study sample, as it is for youth in other 
cities across the Nation (Riley, 1997). 
None of the boys interviewed reported 
ever having used psychedelics or hallucino-
gens, crack or any other type of cocaine, or 
heroin. Only five boys (2.3 percent of the 
sample) reported having tried phencyclidine 
(PCP or "angel dust"), tranquilizers, or barbi-
turates. One boy stated that he had taken 
amphetamines, and one reported prior use 
of an inhalant (such as aerosols or glue). 
These findings are consistent with research 
findings around the country (U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 1997). 
Although LINC found that few boys in 
the sample used illegal drugs other than 
marijuana, it found that a relatively high 
proportion used alcohol and/or marijuana. 
Approximately 30 percent of the study 
sample reported drinking beer or wine 
without adult permission, 18 percent re-
ported drinking hard liquor without adult 
permission, and approximately one-third 
reported using marijuana. 
Alcohol and marijuana use was found to 
be much more prevalent among seriously 
delinquent boys (table 2). Only 7 percent 
of the good kids and 7 percent of the fight-
ers reported drinking hard liquor without 
adult permission, compared with 12 per-
cent of the property offenders, 30 percent 
of the dealers, 39 percent of the property 
offenders/drug dealers, and 60 percent of 
the robbers. Overall, a greater number of 
boys reported drinking wine or beer with-
out adult permission than hard liquor, and 
once again, the more delinquent boys were 
more likely to do so. Slightly more than 
10 percent of the good kids and fighters, 
approximately one-third of the dealers and 
property offenders, and more than half of 
the property offender/drug dealers and 
robbers reported drinking beer or wine 
without adult permission. 
Similarly, marijuana use was reported 
by 11 percent of the good kids, 27 percent 
15 For example, the preamble to the National Gover-
nors' Association (NGA) Policy Statement on Juvenile 
Crime and Delinquency Prevention Programs and Prin-
ciples states, "Delinquency, particularly drug· and gun-
related violence, is escalating at a disturbing rate. 
Young people are killing each other. Children are ter-
rorizing their schools, parks, and neighborhoods. 
Young people are either the loot soldiers or ringlead-
ers in criminal enterprises involved in drug trafficking" 
(National Governors' Association, 1999). 
of the property offenders, 70 percent of 
the property offenders/drug dealers, and 
80 percent of the robbers. The dealers 
reported the greatest use of marijuana, at 
90 percent; the fighters reported the least 
use, at 7 percent. 
Although the study generally found a 
strong association between using hard li-
quor or marijuana and committing delin-
quent acts generally (with boys who used 
hard liquor committing a significantly 
greater number of all types of delinquent 
acts, including violent crimes, and those 
who used marijuana committing more prop-
erty crimes and drug deals), it found no such 
relationship between the use of marijuana 
and the commission of violent crimes. Mari-
juana users, for example, reported commit-
ting more assaults, on average, than the 
boys who did not use marijuana, but these 
differences were not statistically significant. 
The LINC study also found that drinking 
alcohol (of any type) without adult permis-
sion or using marijuana increased a boy's 
likelihood of getting a girl pregnant. 
Slightly more than 12 percent of the boys 
interviewed said that they had impreg-
nated a girl. Of these, 58 percent reported 
having used marijuana. Marijuana users 
were more than twice as likely to get a girl 
pregnant as nonusers: by their own report, 
8 percent of the nonusers and approxi-
mately 20 percent of the users had been 
responsible for a pregnancy. Findings for 
boys who reported drinking beer or wine 
without adult permission were almost the 
same as for boys who reported using mari-
juana. Nineteen percent of those who had 
used beer or wine without adult permis-
sion (and only 9 percent of those who had 
not) were responsible for a pregnancy. 
The likelihood of getting a girl pregnant 
was even greater for boys who drank hard 
liquor. Although less than 9 percent of 
those who did not drink hard liquor re-
ported getting a girl pregnant, 28 percent 
of the boys who drank hard liquor were 
responsible for a pregnancy. 
Considering the different delinquency 
categories of boys in the study sample, 
dealers were the most likely to cause a 
pregnancy (30 percent responsible for a 
pregnancy), closely followed by property 
offenders and robbers (27 percent of boys 
Table 2: Perce~tage of Boys Who Reported Using Hard Liquor or Marijuana, 



























in these groups responsible for a preg-
nancy). Fighters, the least likely to drink, 
were also the least likely to report having 
gotten a girl pregnant (only 7.3 percent re-
ported being responsible for a pregnancy). 
Supervision and Activities 
The Urban Institute's previous analysis 
of youth crime focused on when and where 
offenses by DC youth were taking place 
(Gouvis, Johnson, and Roth, 1997). LINC's 
analysis, by contrast, sought to understand 
the nature and extent of supervision re-
ceived by boys in areas where youth crime 
was relatively rampant and determine what 
policy implications arose from the study's 
findings on supervision. In considering how 
boys in the study sample were occupied 
during and after school, LINC examined 
activities that the boys participated in 
and programs available to them through 
schools and youth-serving organizations 
in the community. LINC's findings on super-
vision and activities are presented in the 
following sections. 
Adult supervision after school. Boys in 
the study sample reported having adults in 
their lives who care about them and want 
to be there for them. Ninety-two percent 
reported having an adult other than a par-
ent who cares "a lot" about them, and 
more than one-quarter (28 percent) named 
a caring adult in their lives (other than a 
member of their immediate family) as the 
adult to whom they felt closest. For most, 
this adult was either a godparent or a 
member of the boy's extended family (e.g., 
a grandparent or other close relative). 
The next most frequently mentioned per-
son was an adult acting as a mentor. Sev-
eral boys named leaders in local youth or-
ganizations as caring adults. 
Notwithstanding the presence of caring 
adults in their lives, boys in DC are most 
likely to encounter violence-as either 
offenders or victims-during the hours im-
mediately before and after school (Gouvis, 
Johnson, and Roth, 1997). LINC's findings, 
based on its interviews of boys in the study 
sample, suggest one probable cause for vio-
lence during these hours: lack of adult 
supervision. In particular, LINC found that 
the vast majority of boys (75 percent) 
spend the afterschool hours unsupervised 
by an adult 1 or more days each week, and 
almost half (48 percent) never receive adult 
supervision during the afterschool hours. 
The relatively few boys who reported 
being supervised by an adult every day 
after school (23 percent of the sample) 
tended to be less delinquent than those 
who received little or no adult supervision 
in the afterschool hours. Forty percent of 
the good kids-as opposed to 20 percent 
of the robbers-were supervised by an 
adult every day after school. 
For boys in the study sample, spend-
ing the afterschool hours in a location 
known to their parents or guardians was 
even more important than spending that 
time with an adult present. Of the good 
kids, only 8. 7 percent reported that their 
primary caregiver rarely or never knew 
where they were during the afterschool 
hours. By contrast, 15 percent of the 
fighters, 18 percent of property offender/ 
drug dealers, 22 percent of property 
offenders, 30 percent of the dealers, and 
33 percent of the robbers reported hav-
ing primary caregivers who rarely or 
never knew where they were during that 
time period. 
Afterschool activities. Boys in the 
study sample reported participating in dif-
ferent types of afterschool activities. LINC 
considered the relationship, if any, be-
tween participation in these activities and 
the likelihood that a boy would become 
involved in delinquency. 
Athletics. Fifty-two percent of boys 
in the sample reported participating in 
sports during the afterschool hours. The 
sports most frequently mentioned by boys 
were football (35 percent participated) and 
basketball (17 percent participated). The 
study showed no relationship, however, 
between participation in these or any 
other sports and the likelihood that a boy 
would become involved in delinquency. In 
other words, good kids, fighters, dealers, 
property offenders, property offenders/ 
drug dealers, and robbers were equally 
likely to participate in athletic activities. 
Participation in school sports appeared 
to have one positive effect. The number of 
drug deals made by boys participating in 
sports was significantly lower than the num-
ber made by nonparticipants. Football play-
ers, in particular, were less likely to sell 
drugs than boys who did not play football, 
with 19 percent of football players and 29 
percent of nonfootball players reporting that 
they sold drugs. On the other hand, delin-
quent boys who played school basketball 
reported committing, on average, almost 
four times more property crimes than those 
who did not play school basketball and 
twice as many delinquent acts overall as 
nonbasketball players. While less involved 
in drug dealing, football players reported 
committing, on average, approximately 
twice as many property crimes as boys who 
did not play football. 16 Although football 
players reported committing more assaults 
than boys who did not play football, the 
differences were not significant. 
Music groups. Approximately 10 per-
cent of boys in the sample reported par-
ticipating in a school band or choir during 
the afterschool hours. Good kids were 
slightly more likely to participate in these 
activities than the more delinquent boys: 
approximately 17 percent of good kids 
participated, compared with 10 percent 
of fighters and dealers and 6 percent of 
property offenders. No difference in rates 
of assaults, drug deals, property offenses, 
or overall delinquent acts was found based 
on a boy's participation in band or choir. 
Clubs that focus on building cognitive 
or social skills. Almost one-quarter (23.5 
percent) of boys in the sample reported 
participating in clubs or other organiza-
tions that focus on building cognitive, 
social, or vocational skills. These groups 
included math and computer clubs, radio 
and television broadcast clubs, cooking and 
catering clubs, art and drama clubs, and 
groups that concentrate on promoting civic 
responsibility and providing community 
services (such as Concerned Black Men and 
student government organizations). 
Several studies have demonstrated 
that afterschool activities designed to in-
crease students' cognitive or social skills 
and provide opportunities for community 
service are effective at preventing delin-
quency (Lipsey, 1992; Sherman eta!., 1997; 
Tolan and Guerra, 1994). In examining the 
16 Like the relationship between employment and delin-
quent behavior (see footnote 13), the study draws no 
conclusion as to whether the relationship between play-
ing football or basketball and committing property 
crimes is coincidental or causal. 
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effect of these activities and the types of 
boys who participated in them, LINC 
found that good kids were not signifi-
cantly more likely to participate in these 
activities than boys in the other delin-
quency categories. LINC also found, how-
ever, that boys involved in these clubs 
reported fewer delinquent acts, with par-
ticipants committing, on average, approxi-
mately five times fewer property crimes 
and six times fewer delinquent acts. Boys 
involved in these activities also reported 
committing fewer assaults on average, but 
participation was not found to be a statis-
tically significant factor in such lower 
rates of assault. 
Activities available through schools 
during school hours. Many cities that 
have experienced an increase in youth 
violence have implemented school-based 
violence prevention programs. 17 Accord-
ing to adolescents in the study sample, 
however, very few or no such programs ex-
ist in their neighborhood schools. When 
asked if they knew of school programs or 
services designed to help students solve 
problems without violence, approximately 
two-thirds answered "no." Of the one-
third who reported knowing of such a 
program, about half (16 percent of the 
total sample) either could not identify a 
specific program or named a program that 
no one else identified. 
Approximately 6 percent of those boys 
who knew of a violence prevention program 
mentioned the Gang Resistance Education 
and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) program and sub-
stance abuse programs such as DARE. A 
17 For reports on different types of school-based vio-
lence intervention programs, see Violence in American 
Schools (Elliott, Hamburg, and Williams, 1998). 
small number of boys mentioned programs 
run by particular counselors or teachers, 
peer programs, conflict resolution programs, 
and mediation. The study found no relation-
ship between boys' identification of school-
based violence prevention programs and 
their level of delinquency. 
Suspension and expulsion. Although 
youth crime peaks in the afterschool hours, 
school hours in DC are also a prime time 
for violence, according to The Urban Insti-
tute. This has not been true in other cities 
(Snyder and Sickmund, 1995). Violence 
during school hours, The Urban Institute 
found, may not necessarily occur on school 
grounds, but in areas surrounding schools 
(Gouvis, Johnson, and Roth, 1997). 
Findings in LINC's study indicate that 
high rates of suspension and expulsion in DC 
schools may be contributing to high rates 
of violence during school hours. The major-
ity of boys in the sample (76 percent), for 
example, reported having been suspended 
from school at least once. Even among the 
good kids, more than half (57 percent) 
had been suspended at least once. All of 
the dealers and almost all (91 percent) 
of the property offenders/drug dealers 
had been suspended at least once. 
Expulsion rates were also high in the 
three study neighborhoods: more than 
20 percent of the boys interviewed reported 
having been expelled from school. In addi-
tion, LINC found a strong association be-
tween expulsion and delinquent behavior. 
Although only 8 percent of the good kids 
and 12 percent of the fighters had been ex-
pelled, 40 percent of the dealers and 40 per-
cent of the robbers had been expelled. 
For the 6-month period prior to the 
interview, the number of delinquent acts 
reported by boys who had been suspen-
ded was, on average, more than three times 
that of boys who had never been suspen-
ded. The boys who, at the time of the in-
terview, said that they were not in school 
reported committing, on average, more 
than four times the number of delinquent 
acts during the preceding 6 months as did 
the boys who were attending school at the 
time of the interview. 
Activities available through youth-
serving organizations. According to writ-
ten materials provided by youth-serving 
organizations, many such organizations in 
DC focus on delinquency prevention and 
skill building. An update of the 1994 
Resource Directory of Youth Services in the 
District of Columbia (updated by ILJ for this 
study) lists more than 50 organizations in 
or adjacent to the three neighborhoods 
Table 3: Programs in Study Neighborhoods Available for Children 
Program type Neighborhood 1 
Academic 4 
Other educational 
Drug abuse only 2 
Drug and alcohol abuse 
Substance abuse education 




Life skills/Parenting skills 
Crisis intervention 
Basic needs 
Child care 4 
Recreation 3 





examined in this study (table 3). Almost 
half of these organizations described them-
selves as providing services for delin-
quency prevention or intervention, and 
approximately 30 percent specified ap-
proaches for supporting the development 
of life skills, parenting skills, and other 
skills found to prevent delinquency. Only 
24 percent of the boys in the study sample 
reported participating in the activities 
or programs of any such community 
organization. 
LINC also found that community cen-
ters and youth service agencies in the Dis-
trict are failing to engage adolescent boys 
in afterschool activities. Although these 
centers and agencies constitute approxi-
mately one-half of the youth services agen-
cies listed for the neighborhoods in which 
the boys lived, less than 4 percent of the 
boys said that they had participated in 
activities provided by a DC community 
center or youth agency. 
Eighty percent of boys in the study 
sample were unable to name a single neigh-
borhood organization with programs de-
signed to help youth solve problems 
without resorting to violence. Less than 
4 percent named a community center or 
other city youth service organization. Al-
though the resource directory lists several 
churches and other religious organizations 
in each of the three neighborhoods, only 
1 percent of the boys named a church 






















largest number of boys (9 percent) was 
the Boys & Girls Club. 
According to the boys' responses, affili-
ates of national youth organizations (such 
as Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Boy 
Scouts of America, the National 4-H Coun-
cil, and Big Brothers Big Sisters of America) 
reached a substantially greater proportion 
of boys than purely local, community-
based organizations. Affiliates, the study 
found, provided services to youth in all six 
delinquency categories. Although almost 
one-half of the boys reported belonging to 
or participating in the activities of an orga-
nization that may have been a local affili-
ate of a national youth-serving organiza-
tion at some time in the past, whether the 
organizations were affiliated with a na-
tional organization could not be verified. 
The organization named by the most boys 
(27 percent) was the Boys Club. However, 
unlike those in other cities (that are affili-
ated with the national organization), some 
Boys Clubs in DC are independent and 
share only the name-and not the pro-
grams, services, or staff training-of the 
national organization. Moreover, at the 
time of their interviews, only 14 percent 
of the boys were still Boys Club members. 
In recent years, major national youth 
organizations, including Boys & Girls Clubs 
and others discussed in this section, have 
developed programs tailored to reaching 
youth in inner-city areas and providing 
them with the types of opportunities that 
research has demonstrated help prevent 
delinquency and allow youth to develop 
skills needed for productive adult lives 
(Chaiken, 1998a). According to a previous 
LINC survey, national affiliates that pro-
vide programs in inner-city neighborhoods 
attract far more adolescent participants 
than their counterparts in locations 
where adolescents are at a lower risk of 
delinquency. Moreover, national affiliates 
are more likely to operate safely in these 
areas when police are responsive to coop-
erating with them (Chaiken, 1998b). 
Efforts of nationally affiliated organiza-
tions launched in the DC area are de-
scribed below. The information is based 
on written materials submitted by the 
organizations. 
+ Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater Washing-
ton has provided outreach programs in 
five DC Club locations and in housing 
developments located in neighborhoods 
with high poverty and crime rates. Pro-
grams provided by these affiliates of the 
national organizat)on include Keystone 
Clubs (designed to present opportuni-
ties for teen boys to develop productive 
leadership skills) and, until DC funds 
were cut, Smart Moves (a delinquency 
prevention program for younger adoles-
cents that is firmly grounded in research 
on adolescent development). 
+ U.S. Department of Agriculture 4-H 
and Youth Development Service, one 
of the first national organizations to 
base programming for at-risk youth on 
research on adolescent development, 
provides skill development programs for 
teens in schools located in high-crime 
areas. While funding was available, it also 
sponsored project HIPS (Helping Indi-
vidual Prostitutes to Survive), an out-
reach program for teen prostitutes that 
included a 24-hour hotline and a van 
sent out on weekend nights (from 10 p.m. 
to 6 a.m.) to provide vital information 
about available services. 
+ Boy Scouts of America, National Capital 
Area Council, has made an effort to re-
cruit boys from kindergarten to grade 12 
attending schools in underserved neigh-
borhoods. Through this new outreach-
and longstanding programs such as 
Learning for Life-the local Boy Scouts 
council provides important opportuni-
ties for youth to develop social skills. 
+ Big Brothers of the National Capital 
Area sponsors "Bigs in Blue," a volun-
teer program in which DC Metropolitan 
Police officers serve as Big Brothers for 
at-risk children in the District. 
Barriers to Delivery of 
Youth Services 
In analyzing data collected from admin-
istrators and staff of youth-serving organi-
zations, LINC found two primary barriers 
to the effective delivery of youth services 
in the District: a lack of coordination be-
tween the DC local government and youth-
serving organizations/agencies in the area 
and an excess number of inactive coalitions 
intended to head efforts to improve youth 
services in DC. 
The "Comparative Analysis" section 
below discusses other barriers to the ef-
fective delivery of youth services by com-
paring DC with other cities and evaluating 
how well the District is delivering services 
and programs to youth. 
Lack of coordination. in Washington, 
DC, the LINC study found, local govern-
ment agencies are involved in very few 
coordinated efforts to address the prob-
lems of juvenile crime, delinquency, and 
violence. LINC's analysis showed that juve-
nile justice and other local government 
agencies in nearby Northern Virginia and 
suburban Maryland are working closely 
with local youth organizations in those 
areas, but that DC's government agencies 
are trying to provide youth programs 
themselves, rather than cooperating with 
youth organizations experienced in pro-
grams and services to youth. 
LINC found that the DC Metropolitan 
Police Department (MPD) staffs eight of 
its own Boys Clubhouses. These clubs are 
maintained through grants and other non-
profit funding sources, but salaries and 
benefits of officers working at the clubs 
are paid by the MPD. As DC's budget 
shrinks or suffers cuts, services such as 
these-dependent on local funds-will 
shrink or disappear as well. As part of this 
study, IU conducted a survey of youth ser-
vices available in DC in 1994. By 1996, IU 
found, IS percent of the services available 
in 1994 (92 out of 620) had vanished. 
Inactive coalitions. This is not the first 
study to recognize a lack of collaboration 
among DC agencies and organizations. Re-
spondents in interviews carried out by 
LINC as part of this research, in fact, com-
monly mentioned that they, the Federal 
Government, and various other national 
organizations had separately sponsored 
coalitions or task forces to spearhead ef-
forts to pull youth-serving organizations in 
DC together. Because many agencies and 
organizations sponsoring coalitions in DC 
have been unaware of one another's efforts, 
DC has many coalitions, each with a rela-
tively small number of participants and 
most of which have failed to produce ef-
fective action plans. In addition, LINC 
found, these coalitions often duplicate 
one another's efforts and goals. 
For example, the Office of Justice Pro-
grams (OJP) in 1993 funded a limited num-
ber of cities to form coalitions to prevent 
violence. Coalitions formed include the DC 
Pulling American Communities Together 
(PACT) Project, which brought a subset of 
DC agencies together to discuss gaps in 
services and design a strategic plan for 
addressing those gaps. A high priority of 
DC PACT was "to coordinate resources 
and share information on local and federal 
anti-violence efforts" (DC PACT, Undated). 
Join Together, a Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation-funded project that was 
founded in 1991 and is based in the Boston 
University School of Public Health, was 
formed to help communities bring about 
concerted action to prevent violence and 
substance abuse. With additional funding 
from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, DC has been one of Join 
Together's focal cities. Kids Count, funded 
by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, was 
designed to support communities around 
the Nation, including DC, to measure and 
report on the status of children (including 
their involvement in violence and drug 
use) in order to promote public action on 
behalf of children locally. 
Although the efforts of PACT, Join To-
gether, and Kids Count have resulted in 
highly visible coalitions and concerted 
strategies in places other than Washington, 
DC, few administrators interviewed in DC 
knew about these three organizations' 
approaches, and none of the respondents 
were aware of more than one of the ap-
proaches. Staff involved in bringing these 
approaches to fruition in DC found the 
experience disheartening because of key 
agencies' unwillingness to cooperate. 
Comparative Analysis 
Process 
After analyzing the data collected from 
boys in the study sample and from youth-
serving organizations, LINC compared its 
findings with those of studies of youth crime 
and responses to youth violence in other 
cities. At the time of the DC study, the au-
thor was involved in research on youth pro-
grams and violence prevention in several 
cities around the Nation. Twelve of these 
cities (each of which had been the subject of 
previous research) were selected for com-
parison with DC. Three (Arlington, TX; 
Bristol, CT; and Spokane, WA) were selected 
by a panel of experts for their exemplary 
approaches to youth crime and violence 
prevention; four (Eureka, CA; Pocatello, 10; 
Rapid City, SO; and Redding, CA) had been 
involved in an ongoing partnership of law 
enforcement agencies and researchers spon-
sored by the National Institute of Justice 
(NI.I); and five (Beaufort and Summerville, 
SC; Philadelphia, PA; and Salinas and San 
Jose, CA) were cities in which a new vio-
lence intervention project (VIP) had recently 
been piloted by the Girl Scouts of America 
and evaluated by LINC.18 The approaches to 
preventing youth violence and furnishing 
safe places for youth during the after-
school hours that were used in these 12 cit-
ies provided an instructive contrast to the 
approaches employed in DC. 
The comparison was carried out with 
two questions in mind: (1) whether the 
relatively high rates of youth violence in 
DC were attributable to differences in pat-
terns of delinquency among DC boys; and 
(2) whether the high rates of youth vio-
lence were a product of the way that DC 
organizations have dealt with children, 
especially adolescent boys. 
Patterns of youth delinquency in dif-
ferent cities have been the subject of crimi-
nological inquiry for more than 50 years. 
Research in the area has included seminal 
"Girl Scout VIP was piloted in other cities that did not 
provide a reasonable basis for comparison with Wash-
ington, DC (Chaiken, 1998a). 
studies in Denver, CO (Huizinga, 1998), 
Philadelphia, PA (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 
1972), Pittsburgh, PA (Browning and Loeber, 
1999), and Rochester, NY (Thornberry and 
Burch, 1997). As discussed above, the fun-
damental patterns of delinquency among 
DC boys are very similar to those found 
among boys in other cities. For example, 
most DC boys reported committing at least 
some minor acts of delinquency involving 
defiance of authorities (such as drinking 
alcohol without adult permission). As find-
ings in other studies have also shown, some 
DC boys were delinquent fighters but lim-
ited their criminal offenses to occasional 
bouts of aggression. Like boys in other 
cities, a relatively small proportion of DC 
boys were the most delinquent in terms of 
the seriousness, spectrum, and number of 
crimes they committed. 
Given the similarities between boys in 
DC and boys in other cities, LINC consid-
ered whether the role of DC agencies and 
organizations could be a factor in the 
higher rates of violence among DC youth. 
Discussion 
In completing its comparative analysis 
of findings in this study and findings in 
studies of the 12 cities listed above, LINC 
concluded that several obstacles stand in 
the way of DC's effective delivery of youth 
services. As a result of these obstacles, DC 
adolescents at the highest risk of violence 
and delinquency may not be receiving nec-
essary support and services. In particular, 
LINC's comparative analysis revealed two 
barriers to the effective delivery of youth 
services in DC: insufficient involvement of 
Federal agencies and local businesses and 
an excess number of unaffiliated and unco-
ordinated organizations. 
Insufficient involvement of Federal 
agencies and local businesses. LINC found 
that in other cities, major industries and 
high-level business executives play an 
important part in meeting local needs-
including those of youth (Chaiken, 1998b). 
Responding to increases in juvenile vio-
lence and crime, for example, business 
leaders in other communities have taken 
steps to ensure that the causes of the 
violence are understood and that measures 
for preventing violence and delinquency are 
undertaken (Chaiken, 1998b). Many have 
donated their time and skills or provided 
incentives for staff members to work with 
youth-serving organizations in roles ranging 
from serving on local boards and commis-
sions to volunteering at local schools to 
leading afterschool programs at community 
centers (Chaiken, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). 
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The Federal Government is the District's 
major industry. LINC's study found, how-
ever, that although Federal employees and 
elected officials may live in the District 
and possess valuable leadership and or-
ganizational skills that would be of help 
to community-based organizations, many 
are not personally involved in any youth-
serving or other civic organizations in DC. 
Several rationales have been offered by 
elected officials and Federal employees in-
terviewed about this lack of involvement. 
Congressional leaders and staff make clear 
that their primary responsibility is to youth 
in their own States, not children in DC. 
Federal employees suggest-correctly or 
incorrectly-that there is an implicit con-
flict of interest in providing personal atten-
tion to organizations that may receive Fed-
eral funds for youth activities. Others say 
their role is to serve all of the Nation's 
children-rather than those in a particular 
city. Others offer the justification that at-
tempts by Federal employees to bring 
about change in DC would be resented as 
interfering with home rule. Yet, from a com-
parative perspective, the major difference 
between Federal agencies and private in-
dustry is that the latter realizes an eco-
nomic benefit from actively promoting 
strong programs for youth. In cities such 
as Arlington, TX, chief executive officers 
(CEO's) in private companies point out that 
by solving youth problems and reducing 
crime, their companies have a competitive 
advantage in recruiting the best and bright-
est employees to move to and live in the 
local area. They also realize that local 
high-quality afterschool programs that 
attract and supervise adolescents allow 
employees with school-age children to 
work without interruptions and more pro-
ductively during the hours when school is 
not in session. CEO's also view the good 
will generated by encouraging employees 
to play active roles in delivering services 
to youth as a form of capital investment. 
Excess number of unaffiliated organi-
zations. In many cities, the majority of 
organizations serving youth are members 
or affiliates of larger "umbrella" organiza-
tions (see, e.g., Chaiken, 1998b). For ex-
ample, a city may have a large number of 
Boys & Girls Club programs, all of which 
operate under the aegis of a regional office 
of the Boys & Girls Clubs of America orga-
nization. Moreover, in cities such as Arling-
ton, TX, and Spokane, WA, there is a high 
degree of coordination among the vari-
ous umbrella organizations. Together, the 
organizations carve out niches of 
expertise, plan services to ensure that 
school-age children in all parts of the city 
are served, and provide a selection of 
interesting and educational activities 
for young participants to choose from. 
Affiliates also cooperate in citywide 
assessments of children's needs and 
support one another's fundraising 
activities. In cities such as Bristol, CT, 
these organizations work with the police 
department and the schools to identify 
youth who are getting into trouble be-
cause they are unsupervised; together, 
these groups have developed a plan to 
ensure that the identified youth are 
brought into at least one organization and 
are involved in skill-building activities. 
In DC, no such cooperation is taking 
place. Organizations have not carved out 
different areas of expertise to address the 
multiple needs of children in the District. 
The ILJ update of the 1994 directory of 
services showed high turnover of organi-
zations receiving funds to provide youth 
services. In interviews for this study, 
administrators in unaffiliated organiza-
tions made clear that they found it Impos-
sible to carve out a niche of expertise. To 
continue to exist, administrators explained, 
organizations needed to shift missions 
when funding was lost and when addi-
tional funding became available. 
Program funding, LINC found, appeared 
to be based on hunches about the needs 
of children in the District rather than a 
common base of research. Some adminis-
trators, for example, knew about the DC 
Kids Count program; most did not. Some 
administrators described certain pro-
grams proudly as preventing delinquency 
by building self-esteem or through athletic 
activities, even though a growing body of 
research suggests that such programs are 
not effective (folan and Guerra, 1994). In 
addition, DC funding was cut for the nation-
ally affiliated Boys & Girls Clubs' Smart 
Moves programs, even though these pro-
grams include components shown to re-
duce delinquency. 
Policy Implications: 
What Can Be Done for 
Boys in DC? 
Providing Early Intervention 
Although the youngest boys in the 
sample were on average the least delin-
quent, some very young boys (13-year-olds) 
reported seriously delinquent conduct. Such 
conduct-together with a marked increase 
in the seriousness of delinquent conduct 
as boys get older-demonstrates a com-
pelling need for early intervention. Many 
cities have met this need by offering proven 
programs such as Head Start and provid-
ing parenting classes and home visits to 
youth at high risk of delinquency (Chaiken 
and Huizinga, 1995). 
Providing Structure and 
Supervision 
Because of the high incidence of violence 
committed by or against youth during 
afterschool hours, many communities have 
focused on providing supervision and struc-
tured activities-especially for children at 
high risk for violence-during that time pe-
riod (Chaiken, 1998b). The six recommenda-
tions below would address specific con-
cerns relating to the lack of supervision for 
boys in DC during the afterschool hours. 
Bring boys under control of respon-
sible adults. In many cities across the Na-
tion, juvenile violence is declining (Poe-
Yamagata, 1998; Fox and Zawitz, 1998). A 
growing number of researchers and policy 
analysts agree that the decline is largely 
attributable to concerted community ef-
forts to bring adolescents under the con-
trol of adults who have the authority to: 
+ Make and make known clear and spe-
cific rules for behavior. 
+ Make and make known clear and fair 
sanctions for breaking these rules. 
+ Apply these sanctions immediately to 
those who violate rules. 
+ Make other youth aware of when and why 
particular sanctions have been applied. 
The following adults in each commu-
nity should work together and support 
one another's efforts to bring children 
under their control: 
+ Family members and other caregivers. 
+ Neighbors working together in 
community-based organizations. 
+ School staff members, including 
administrators, teachers, a,nd guidance 
counselors. 
+ Staff and administrators of youth-serving 
organizations that offer educational and 
recreational programs for youth during 
the afterschool hours. 
+ Police and other law enforcement 
officers. 
+ Probation officers, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and other professionals in 
the juvenile justice system. 
+ Staff of child welfare and protective 
services agencies. 
Channel energy into productive ac-
tivities. Many cities have moved beyond 
simply controlling delinquent behavior 
to channeling the energy of youth into 
productive activities-including crime 
reduction activities. Under the supervi-
sion of adults skilled in guiding them, 
young people are taking the lead In 
projects such as neighborhood cleanups, 
vandalism and graffiti removal projects, 
Neighborhood Watch programs, commu-
nity pride days, and cross-age tutoring 
and mentoring programs for younger chil-
dren (Chaiken, 1998b). Recent research 
shows that participation in these activi-
ties reduces teen pregnancy and substance 
abuse more than standard educational 
approaches to delinquency reduction 
(Allen eta!., 1997). Caring adults-parents, 
other caregivers, and staff in local unaffili-
ated youth organizations-provide a 
tremendous potential resource for con-
trolling and guiding youth. 
A growing body of research, however, 
also shows that not all afterschool pro-
grams are effective at preventing violence 
and delinquency (folan and Guerra, 1994). 
In fact, sports, one of the most widely pro-
vided afterschool activities for adolescent 
boys, was shown to have little or no posi-
tive effect on violence or other forms of 
delinquent behavior. Rather than focusing 
on athletic activities, therefore, policy-
makers may want to provide programs 
shown to be effective at reducing delin-
quent behavior (for example, programs 
intended to teach cognitive skills). 
In attempting to channel youth's energy 
in a positive direction, policymakers should 
also aim to convince DC boys that their 
earning power in the long run will be higher 
if they pursue legal money-earning activi-
ties in their spare time. By doing so, DC 
may be able to use the boys' strong eco-
nomic motivations as an incentive for posi-
tive rather than antisocial behavior. In 
Redding, CA, for example, police officers 
have capitalized on boys' economic moti-
vations by giving groups of youth "COPS 
dollars" when they complete projects to 
improve their neighborhoods. Endorsed 
by local merchants, COPS dollars can be 
redeemed at restaurants and other busi-
nesses popular with community youth. As 
a result of this program, boys in blighted 
areas who used to hang out and get into 
trouble are removing litter, cleaning up 
vacant lots, and creating play and recre-
ation areas for themselves and younger 
children. Judging from their willingness to 
approach officers and ask what needs to 
be done in return for COPS dollars, boys-
in addition to the police, businesses, and 
other residents-favor this approach. 19 
Adjust police patrols. Another action 
that DC may take to reduce violence and 
delinquency during afterschool hours is 
increasing the number of police patrols 
during the hours that area schools release 
students. Although one additional patrol 
car is not likely to have a major impact on 
levels of afterschool violence, several of-
ficers walking the streets and talking to 
students as they leave school have been 
effective in other cities. In Eureka, CA, for 
example, a growing number of assaults in-
volving youth (including drive-by shootings 
near one school) were essentially eliminated 
after the police department appointed an 
experienced officer to serve as a school-
based youth/ethnic liaison officer. During 
19 Based on observations and interviews being carried 
out as part of NJJ-sponsored LINC project 95-JJ-CX-D04 7. 
school hours, this officer works in partner-
ship with administrators, counselors, and 
teachers to reduce truancy and other 
harmful behavior through a combination 
of teaching, counseling, and coordinated 
case management. During school breaks 
and before and after school hours, the of-
ficer patrols the streets surrounding the 
school and stays in radio contact with 
school staff monitoring school property 
and nearby areas.20 
Other cities' patrol plans have involved 
not only the police, but neighbors, local 
business owners, and youth organizations, 
in an effort to minimize the chance that 
releasing large groups of students into the 
community at the same time each day will 
result in fights or violence (Chaiken, 1998b). 
Steps taken in other cities include having 
adults with police walkie-talkies patrol 
streets near schools each day during ar-
rival and departure times, keeping stu-
dents engaged in constructive afterschool 
activities, and transporting students di-
rectly home following these activities (by 
which time children's parents or other 
caregivers will have returned home from 
work) (Chaiken, 1998b). 
Involve national organizations. A 
survey of seven national youth-serving 
organizations revealed that such organ-
izations are reaching significantly larger 
numbers of children at high risk of vio-
lence and delinquency in cities other than 
DC (Chaiken, 1998b). According to the 
survey, nationally affiliated organizations in 
other cities are providing constructive ac-
tivities at the very time children are most 
at risk for violence in most parts of the 
country-the afterschool hours. Increasing 
the involvement of the many local chapters 
and affiliates of national youth organiza-
tions in the District is essential to reducing 
youth violence and delinquency in DC. 
Involve local organizations. As the 
Nation's Capital, Washington, DC, is home 
to numerous private foundations, firms, 
Federal agencies, and universities that have 
spent large sums of money on research, 
demonstration projects, and evaluations 
focused on determining what works and 
what does not work in preventing juvenile 
violence and delinquency and promoting 
the healthy and safe development of youth. 
In fighting violence and juvenile delin-
quency, the DC community needs to tap into 
the knowledge, experience, and resources 
of all of these organizations and enlist their 
20 Based on observations and interviews being carried 
out as part of NIJ-sponsored LINC project 95-IJ-CX-D047. 
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support and active involvement in providing 
structure and supervision to youth. 
Address needs of expelled and sus-
pended students. As a result of high rates 
of suspension and expulsion in DC, large 
numbers of boys are released into the com-
munity without supervision. Without super-
vision and structured activities, many of 
these boys are committing delinquent acts. 
Both to protect the community and to meet 
the needs of expelled and suspended stu-
dents, parents, school administrators, gov-
ernment agencies, and youth-serving orga-
nizations in DC need to explore ways to 
deliver safe and meaningful activities to 
these students during school hours. In cit-
ies such as Pocatello, ID, and Eureka, CA, 
youth who are removed from traditional 
classrooms because of disruptive behavior 
are placed in alternative classes with fewer 
students and with teachers specifically 
trained to address behavior problems. 
Rather than allowing students to wander 
the streets unsupervised, these communi-
ties are providing increased supervision. In 
Pocatello, the community is also securing and 
seeking the enforcement of injunctions that 
prohibit students from gathering together 
outside a school setting during school hours. 
Applying Swift and 
Sure Sanctions 
As shown by LINC's study, a small num-
ber of youth in the three DC study neigh-
borhoods are responsible for a large pro-
portion of the crime and violence. To 
combat youth violence and crime, authori-
ties need to apply swift and sure sanctions 
to the city's most serious juvenile offend-
ers. These offenders need to be identified 
and informed of the sanctions for specific 
categories of delinquent behavior (both 
for themselves and for any "crews," gangs, 
groups of friends, or other individuals who 
act as accessories). In addition, because 
serious offenders should be sanctioned 
immediately after committing delinquent 
acts, the cumbersome process of handling 
juveniles in courts and corrections must 
be streamlined. 
An immediate and substantial response 
by the criminal justice system to delinquent 
acts can effectively control serious offend-
ers' worst behavior. In Boston, MA, for ex-
ample, Federal, State, and local law enforce-
ment agencies have worked together to 
crack down on illegal gun markets, and 
local agencies have made a concerted effort 
to identify and control the city's most vio-
lent youth (including gang members). As a 
result of these efforts, escalating rates of 
youth violence dropped precipitously. To 
carry out a Boston-type effort and get seri-
ous juvenile offenders under control, DC will 
need the same cooperation among commu-
nity groups, law enforcement officers, and 
juvenile justice agencies that took place in 
Boston and surrounding communities 
(Kennedy, 1998). 
This type of community action presents 
an opportunity for DC and its police depart-
ment to reorganize immediately-and for a 
cause that is likely to enjoy the community's 
full support. It also creates an opportunity 
for Federal agencies, such as the U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury's Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the 
U.S. Department of Justice's Drug Enforce-
ment Administration and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, to act as partners in support 
of the MPD. At the same time, it allows re-
searchers who have studied effective ap-
proaches in other cities to provide practical 
advice to policymakers about the resources, 
tactics, and personnel needed to apply swift 
and sure sanctions to the small number of 
serious and violent juvenile offenders in DC. 
By sending a clear message that violence 
and the use of weapons will not be tolerated 
and applying sanctions immediately for 
delinquent acts, DC may encourage its 
most serious juvenile offenders and their 
friends to pursue noncriminal activities. 
Reducing Gun Violence 
Strategies for reducing youth violence 
involving guns include making guns safer, 
making them less available, and influencing 
how youth use them (Mercy and Rosenberg, 
1998). Although the first strategy requires 
technological advances, recent research 
has revealed a promising measure for re-
ducing gun availability (and, in turn, reduc-
ing the number of fatalities and injuries 
resulting from fights or incidents involv-
ing guns) (Kennedy, 1998). Recent research 
has also revealed a way to affect teens' will-
ingness to stop carrying guns. These mea-
sures are described below. 
Identify and shut down suppliers. Work-
ing with local police departments in a num-
ber of areas, including DC, ATF has traced 
guns being used by youth and found that 
in most cities, guns are being supplied by a 
limited number of out-of-State gun dealers 
(Kennedy, 1998). Once identified, some gun 
suppliers have been closed down. Contin-
ued collaboration with ATF is well advised. 
Enlist the boys' help in reducing gun 
use. A substantial body of research reveals 
that in violent neighborhoods, boys carry 
guns for protection primarily because 
other boys or men carry guns (Mercy and 
Rosenberg, 1998). To break this cycle of 
violence, policymakers need to convince 
boys that if they stop carrying guns, others 
will do so too. In neighborhoods such as 
Arlington, TX, youth workers have found 
that teens are most likely to stop carrying 
guns when they are involved in the process 
of deciding when and where police will en-
join weapon carrying, how the prohibitions 
will be monitored, and what sanctions will 
be applied for violations (Chaiken, 1998b). 
In cities such as Boston, MA (Kennedy, 
1998), New York, NY (Bruce Johnson, National 
Development & Research Institutes, Inc., 
1997, personal communication), and 
Redding, CA,21 groups of boys previously 
involved in violence were Informed by 
police and other juvenile justice agencies 
of steps that would be taken to control 
the entire group if any boy in the group 
violated any gun laws. Such crackdowns 
rapidly led to self-policing on the part of 
formerly violent groups-and a rapid 
reduction in the number of gun fatalities 
in those cities (Kennedy, 1998). 
Improving Coordination 
Between government agencies and pri-
vate organizations. Realizing that, under 
the current organizational structure in DC, 
no single agency can deal with the many 
aspects of youth development and the many 
causes of delinquency, government agencies 
in the city, including schools, the police de-
partment, and child welfare and protective 
services agencies, should work together 
and reach out to private organizations to 
address problems collectively (Chaiken, 
1998b). Representatives from these agencies 
and organizations, as in other cities, could 
come together to propose and implement 
coordinated action plans to help both indi-
vidual children in trouble and small groups 
of children who may be experiencing or 
causing problems in their neighborhoods 
or schools. The combined expertise of rep-
resentatives from different organizations 
serves children and their communities well. 
Among local affiliates of national orga-
nizations. Affiliation with national organiza-
tions sustains access to proven programs 
and materials designed by youth develop-
ment professionals and evaluated by re-
searchers. Executive directors of affiliates of 
national youth organizations typically work 
together on an ongoing basis to define the 
niche that each will fill (Chaiken, 1998b). 
Although they may not share specific pro-
gram materials, organizations often share 
space, keep one another informed of emerg-
21 Data collected by LINC as part of NIJ grant 
95-IJ-CX-0047. 
ing problems facing youth, and support one 
another's fundraising activities. Officers of 
different affiliates of national organizations 
may serve on local boards and commissions 
together, along with key members of the 
business community and top administrators 
of local government agencies. Absent coor-
dination with one another and oversight of a 
national organization, organizations may 
duplicate efforts or fail to use funds for 
direct services to youth. Each unaffiliated 
organization, for example, needs funds to 
support costly administrative functions, 
facility maintenance, preparation of grant 
proposals, and other fundraising activities. 
As a result of collaboration among non-
profit youth organizations in many cities, 
adolescents in poor neighborhoods (those 
most vulnerable to delinquency) have ac-
cess to a variety of afterschool programs 
such as computer classes, drama activities, 
and tutoring. These programs help youth 
build skills that in the short term prevent 
delinquency and that in the long term may 
promote a successful transition to produc-
tive adulthood (Chaiken, 1998c). Given the 
lack of such coordination in DC, children 
from the three neighborhoods studied have 
had access to few such programs. 
Conclusion 
As reflected by this study's findings, vio-
lence by juveniles in DC is far from random. 
Regular patterns exist as to where and when 
it takes place and what types of boys are 
committing violent acts. These patterns are 
essentially the same as those found in other 
cities-including many that have made ma-
jor strides in reducing juvenile violence in a 
relatively short period of time. 
With resources equal to or greater 
than those of cities that have implemented 
effective juvenile crime prevention pro-
grams, Washington, DC, should look to the 
success of other cities and begin imple-
menting similar programs for its own 
youth. Beginning in the most violent neigh-
borhoods, DC should develop an action plan 
for bringing delinquent boys under control. 
With violence and crime in these areas con-
trolled, the city could then work on a more 
comprehensive strategy for delinquency pre-
vention and youth development. Any such 
strategy, however, will require the concerted 
efforts of a variety of community members 
and organizations. Only by coordinating 
efforts-across agencies, organizations, 
schools, and even neighborhood lines-will 
DC address and eliminate the most serious 
patterns of delinquency and control the most 
delinquent youth. 
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